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Aborting the Rights of Minors?
Questioning the Constitutionality of
California's Parental Consent Statute
In Roe v. Wade,' the United States Supreme Court concluded that
the right to privacy guaranteed the right of a woman to obtain an
abortion.2 Since this landmark decision by the Court, the right of a
woman to obtain an abortion free from government interference has
produced controversy. One aspect of the abortion controversy is the
ability of pregnant minors to receive abortions free from parental and
governmental interference. Some states require parental consent before
a minor may obtaifl an abortion.' Other states require prior parental
notification.4 These efforts to restrict the rights of minors to obtain
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Roe and the companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), are the landmark
cases on abortion handed down by the United States Supreme Court. These cases establish that
a woman has a fundamental right to make an abortion decision, without interference by the
state, during the first trimester of pregnancy. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-64. Additionally, prior to
the point in time when the fetus becomes viable, the state may only place reasonable regulations
on the abortion procedure. Id. at 163. Only after the point in time when the fetus becomes
viable does the state have a compelling state interest in the preservation of the life of the fetus.
Id. at 163.
3. See ALA. CODE §§ 26-21-1 to 26-21-8 (Supp. 1987); ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(3) (1987);
Amiz. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2152 to 36-2153 (Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(4) (West
1986); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-58.5-2.5 (West 1986); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.732 (Baldwin
1987); LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 40.1299.35.5 (West Supp. 1988); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
112, § 12S (West 1983); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-51 to 41-41-63 (Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 188.028 (Vernon Supp. 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.02.1-03.1 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 3206 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-6 (1985); S.C. CODE Am. § 44-41-30
(Law. Co-op 1985); S.D. CODnED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-7 (1986); WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. §
9.02.070 (1988).
4. See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-112 (Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE § 18-609(6) (1987); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. § 22, 1597 (1980); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-103 (1987); MiNN.
STAT. ANN. § 144.343(2) (West Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-107 (1987); NEv. Rv.
STAT. ANN. § 442.255 (Michie 1986); Owo Rav. CODE Am. §§ 2151.85, 2505.07.3 (Anderson
Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-202(f) (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (1978); W.
VA. CODE § 16-2F-3 (1985).
1487
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 19
an abortion have met with varying degrees of success when challenged
in the courts.
5
Under Assembly Bill 2274 (A.B. 2274)6 a pregnant minor in Cali-
fornia must obtain parental consent or permission of the juvenile court
before obtaining an* abortion.7 The passage of A.B. 2274, however,
raises three constitutional issues. First, the parental consent statute
may violate the federal constitutional right to privacy. Second, A.B.
2274 may unduly burden the constitutionally protected rights of ma-
ture, informed minors and of those minors for whom an abortion is
in their best interest.9 Third, the California legislation may violate the
express right to privacy found in the California Constitution.'0
This comment will discuss the constitutional ramifications of A.B.
2274 under both the United- States and California Constitutions.
Initially, this comment will review United States Supreme Court de-
cisions addressing the rights of states to regulate abortion for minors."
Next, this comment will examine the purposes and the statutory
language of A.B. 2274.12 After exploring the background of A.B.
2274, the constitutionality of the California legislation under the United
States Constitution will be examined." In this section, A.B. 2274 will
be analyzed to determine whether the legislation violates the federal
right to privacy.' 4 Next, this section will analyze whether A.B. 2274
unduly burdens the constitutionally protected rights of mature and
informed minors or minors whose best interests warrant an abortion."
Finally, this comment will analyze the California legislation under the
California Constitution. 16 This comment will conclude that the Cali-
fornia parental consent statute violates both the United States and the
California Constitutions.
5. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (striking down Missouri
parental consent statute); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (striking down Massachusetts
parental consent statute); H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding Utah parental
notification statute).
6. 1987 Cal. Stat. ch, 1237, at __.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 61-68. See also Review of Selected 1987 California
Legislation, 19 PAC. L.J. 646, 646-47 (1988) (describing the California parental consent statute).
8. See infra notes 78-121 and accompanying text. -
9. See infra notes 122-71 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 172-211,and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 17-52 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 53-68 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 78-171 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 78-121 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 122-71 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 172-211 and accompanying text.
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BACKGROUND Or A.B. 2274
A. United States Supreme Court Decisions Regulating Abortion
Prior to 1973, women could obtain an abortion in California only
if a physician determined that the pregnancy created a substantial risk
of impairing the prospective mental or physical health of the mother,
or the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest." In 1973, the United
States Supreme Court ruled in Roe v. Wade'8 that the fundamental
right to privacy protected by the United States Constitution included
the right of a woman to seek an abortion during the first trimester
of pregnancy. 9 The Roe Court found unconstitutional a provision in
the Texas Penal Code that made a crime of procuring or attempting
an abortion except for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.20
By invalidating this statute, the Roe Court proclaimed that the fun-
damental right to privacy is broad enough to encompass a decision
by a woman to terminate her pregnancy.2'
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the right of a
minor to have an abortion in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth.22
Danforth involved a challenge to a Missouri statute that required an
unemancipated minor to have the written consent of a parent or
guardian before obtaining an abortion. 23 The Court first recognized
17. See 1967 Cal. Stat. ch. 327, sec. 1, at 1521 (enacting Therapeutic Abortion Act, CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25950-25954). See Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 883-84, 484
P.2d 1345, 1352-53, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8-9 (1971) (construing 1953 Cal. Stat. ch. 1654, sec. 1, at
3383 (enacting CAL. Crv. CODE § 34.5) as allowing performance of a therapeutic abortion on a
minor).
18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
20. Id. at 164. See id. at 117 n.] (quoting TExAs PENAL CODE art. 1191-1194, 1196,
recodified as TExAs Ray. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.1-4512.4, 4512.6 (Yernon 1984)) (then
existing statutes that made procuring or attempting an abortion a crime unless the purpose of
the abortion was to save the life of the mother).
21. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 1. While the United States
Constitution does not expressly provide a right to privacy, the right to privacy has long been
recognized based on the concept of personal liberty expressed in the fourteenth amendment. Roe,
410 U.S. at 152. See also CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § I (containing an express inalienable right to
privacy).
22. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
23. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 72-75. See Act of June 14, 1974, § 3(4), 1974 Mo. Laws 809,
810. The statute required "the written consent of one parint or person in loco parentis of the
woman if the woman is unmarried and under the age of eighteen years, unless the abortion is
certified by a licensed physician as necessary in order to preserve the life of the mother." !d.
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that the right to privacy discussed in Roe extended to minors as well
as to adults.24 Nevertheless, the Danforth Court affirmed that the
states have a somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of
minors as opposed to the activities of adults.2 The Danforth Court
concluded that no significant state interest could justify a blanket
provision requiring parental consent before the minor could terminate
her pregnancy.2 As a result, the Danforth Court held the Missouri
provision unconstitutional.
27
The United States Supreme Court further commented on the rights
of minors to obtain abortions free from governmental interference in
Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti 11).28 The Supreme Court in Bellotti II
reviewed a Massachusetts statute that required consent of the minor
and both her parents before she could obtain an abortion. 29 Regardless
of the minor's maturity, if one or both of her parents refused consent,
the minor could seek a judicial order showing that the best interest
of the minor warranted the abortion. 0 According to the Bellotti II
Court, the constitutional right to privacy and the unique nature of
the abortion decision required a state to act with particular sensitivity
when trying to foster parental involvement.' The Supreme Court,
however, split on how to balance the right to privacy of the minor
24. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. The Court noted that constitutional rights do not mature and
become "magical" only upon reaching the state-defined age of majority. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 74-75. The Danforth Court noted that a state does not possess the constitutional
authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the physician-patient
decision to terminate the pregnancy of the patient, no matter what reason existed for withholding
consent. Id. at 74.
27. See id. at 75. Any independent interest the parent may have in the abortion decision of
the minor is no more weighty than the right of privacy of the competent minor who is mature
enough to get pregnant. Id.
28. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
29. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 651. See 1974 Mass. Acts ch. 706, at 713. The statute provided
in part the following:
If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and has not married, the consent of
both the mother and her parents is required. If one or both of the mother's parents
refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by order of a judge of the superior
court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary. Such a hearing
will not require the appointment of a guardian for the mother. If one of the parents
has died or has deserted his or her family, consent by the remaining parent is sufficient.
If both parents have died or have deserted their family, consent of the mother's
guardian or other person having duties similar to a guardian, or any person who had
assumed the care and the custody of the mother is sufficient. The commissioner of
public health shall prescribe a written form for such consent. Such form shall be
signed by the proper person or persons and given to the physician performing the
abortion who shall maintain it in his permanent files.
Id. sec. 1, at 713.
30. Id.
31. Bellorti II, 443 U.S. at 642.
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against the interest of the state in encouraging parental involvement.12
In a plurality decision,3 the Supreme Court, concluded that a state
requiring parental consent must also provide an alternative procedure
for the minor to seek authorization for the abortion? 4 The concurring
opinion," however, while agreeing that the Massachusetts statute vi-
olated the constitutional right to privacy of pregnant minors, disagreed
as to the soundness of an alternative procedure.
6
The United States Supreme Court continued to delineate the ability
of minors to seek an abortion without parental involvement in H. L.
v. Matheson.37 Matheson involved a Utah statute that required a
physician to notify, if possible, the parents or guardian of a minor
seeking an abortion. 8 The Matheson Court, in dicta, reaffirmed the
Bellotti II conclusion that a state may not constitutionally legislate a
blanket unreviewable parental veto power over the ability of a minor
io receive an abortion.3 9 The Supreme Court in Matheson held that a
statute requiring mere parental notice does not violate the constitutional
rights of an immature, dependent minor. 40 Specifically, the Matheson
Court held that requiring parental notice is constitutional when the
minor is living with and dependent upon her parents, is not emanci-
pated by marriage or otherwise, and has made no claim or showing
as to her maturity or relations with her parents.
4 '
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court continued to develop the
parameters of the rights of a state to regulate the abortion decisions
of minors. In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health,42 the Supreme Court struck down a local ordinance that did
not expressly create an alternative procedure to allow the minor to
32. See id. at 651 n.32 (defending the use of the alternative procedure enumerated in the
plurality opinion).
33. See id. at 625 (the plurality included Justices Powell, Burger, Stewart, and Rehnquist).
34. Id. at 643. The procedure must ensure that the provision requiring parental consent
does not amount to an "absolute and possibly arbitrary veto." Id. at 644.
35. See id. at 652 (Stevens, J., concurring) (the concurring Justices included Stevens, Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun).
36. Id. at 656 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring).
37. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
38. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 414. The Utah statute requires a physician to "[n]otify, if
possible, the parents or guardian of a woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed, if
she is a minor. .. ." UTAH CODE A-z,. § 76-7-304(2) (1978).
39. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 409.
40. Id. The Matheson Court distinguished the Utah statute from parental consent statutes
on the basis that notice requirements did not functionally give parents a veto power. Id. at 411
n.17.
41. Id. at 407, 413.
42. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
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avoid a parental veto.43 The Court concluded that the Ohio court
proceedings available to the minor to petition for waiver of parental
consent could not reasonably be construed to create an opportunity
for a case-by-case evaluation of the maturity of pregnant minors. 
44
Furthermore, the Court ruled that the municipal ordinance failed to
provide minors the opportunity to avoid hostile parents by demon-
strating maturity.
4s
In Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft,4 the Court re-
viewed a Missouri parental consent statute that requires the juvenile
court to examine evidence on the emotional development, maturity,
intellect, and understanding of the minor for purposes of granting or
denying her petition for permission to obtain an abortion absent
parental consent. 47 The Ashcroft Court held that a juvenile court
deciding whether the minor could obtain an abortion could not deny
a petition for good cause without first finding that the minor was not
mature enough to make a decision regarding abortion.8 The Ashcroft
Court was aware that if the Missouri statute allowed the juvenile court
discretion in denying permission to a minor for any "good cause,"
the statute would violate the principles that the United States Supreme
Court had set forth. 49 Before' exercising any option, however, the
juvenile court had to receive evidence on "the emotional development,
43. Akron, 462 U.S. at 440-42. The ordinance prohibited a physician from performing an
abortion on an unmarried minor under the age of 15 unless the physician obtained consent of
one of the minor's parents or the minor obtained a court order allowing the abortion. Id. at
422 n.4 (quoting AKRON, OH. Op iNqAcEs, ch. 1870, § 1870.05(B) (1978)). The Akron Court
determined that the city could not make a blanket decision that all minors under 15 were too
immature and that an abortion would never be in the best interest of the minor without parental
approval. Akron, 462 U.S. at 440.
44. Akron, 462 U.S. at 441. Akron sought to invoke an Ohio statute governing juvenile
proceedings, but that statute neither mentioned minors' abortions nor suggested that the Ohio
Juvenile Court had authority to determine a minor's maturity or emancipation. Id. See Act of
August 5, 1981, 1981 Ohio Laws 1297, 1333 (amending Onio REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.23) (stating
that the Ohio Juvenile Court has jurisdiction over any child that is alleged to be delinquent,
unruly, abused, neglected, dependent, or a juvenile traffic offender).
45. Akron, 462 U.S. at 441, n.31. If the juvenile court had jurisdiction, the statute required
that the parents of the minor be notified once a petition was filed. See Oto REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.28 (Anderson 1976). That requirement would be unconstitutional in the case of a mature
minor seeking an abortion. Akron, 462 U.S. at 441, n.31.
46. 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
47. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 490-93. The statute 'requires the court to hear the following
evidence before granting or denying the petition: (1) Evidence relating to the emotional devel-
opment, maturity, intellect, and understanding of the minor; (2) the nature, possible consequences,
and alternatives to the abortion; and (3) any other evidence that the court may find useful in
determining whether the abortion is in the best interest of the minor. 1979 Mo. Laws 375, 376
(enacting Mo. REy. STAT. § 188.028 2(3)).
48. Ashcroft. 462 U.S. at 493.
49. Id.
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maturity, intellect, and understanding of the minor." 50 Consequently,
the Ashcroft Court determined that the Missouri statute was consti-
tutional:'
Thus, states may regulate the ability of a minor to obtain an
abortion. The difficulty, however, arises in determining what degree
of state regulation the United States Supreme Court will find uncon-
stitutional. Because no definite set of statutory guidelines has emerged,
states have taken different approaches to drafting such statutes.12 As
a result, the validity of A.B. 2274 remains in question until the issue
is judicially resolved.
B. Legislative Purposes of A.B. 2274
The California Legislature enacted A.B. 2274 for the primary pur-
pose of protecting the well-being of minors by encouraging minors to
discuss the decision of whether to terminate their pregnancies with
their parents.53 According to the legislature, there are several reasons
why California needs a statute to achieve this goal.54 First, the legis-
lature found that abortions may create serious and long-lasting medical,
emotional, and psychological consequences for the minor. 51 Immature
minors are particularly susceptible to these consequences.56 Addition-
ally, the legislature noted that no logical relation exists between the
capacity to become pregnant and the capacity for exercising mature
judgment concerning the wisdom of the abortion 7.5  The legislature
stated that minors often lack the ability to make informed choices
and to consider both the immediate and long-range -consequences of
their actions.58 Furthermore, parents ordinarily possess information
50. Id. See 1979 Mo. Laws 376 (enacting Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.028 2(3)) (providing that
the juvenile court must receive evidence 'on the emotional development, maturity, intellect, and
understanding of the minor).
51. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 493.
52. See supra notes 3-4 (various state statutes that require either parental notification or
parental consent).
53. See 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 1237, sec. 1, at ._. (while the legislative findings do not
explicitly provide this purpose, the general meaning derived from the findings make clear that
this is the goal of the legislature).
54. Id. (stating findings of the legislature upon enactment of A.B. 2274).
55. Id. See also H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981) (stating that abortion may
create serious and long-lasting medical, emotional, and psychological consequences for the minor).
56. 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 1237, sec. 1 at _ .
57. Id. See also Matheson, 450 U.S. at 408 (stating that no logical relationship exists between
exercising mature judgment and the capacity to become pregnant).
58. 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 1237, sec. 1, at __ . See also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640
(1979) (stating that minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices that consider
both the immediate and long-range consequences of their actions).
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that allows a physician to exercise sound medical judgment when
treating a minor childA9 Parents who are aware that their minor
daughter has received an abortion may better ensure that their daughter
obtains adequate post-abortion care. 60 Thus, the California Legislature
enacted A.B. 2274 to address these concerns.
C. The Statutory Language of A.B. 2274
The California Legislature passed A.B. 2274 to regulate the ability
of a pregnant minor to obtain an abortion without parental or judicial
guidance. A.B. 2274 prohibits an unemancipated6t minor 62 from re-
ceiving an abortion unless the minor and one parent gives written
consent for the abortion. 3 If the parent refuses consent or if the
minor elects not to seek parental consent, A.B. 2274 enables a minor
to bypass the parental consent requirement by petitioning the juvenile
court64 for an order authorizing the minor to receive the abortion.65
The court must authorize the abortion if the assenting minor possesses
sufficient maturity and information to make the decision. 6 Even if
59. 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 1237, sec. 1, at __ . See also Matheson, 450 U.S. at 405 (stating
that parents ordinarily possess information that allows a physician to exercise sound medical
judgment when treating a minor child).
60. 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 1237, sec. 1, at -.
61. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 62 (West 1982). A minor must have married, been on active duty
in the armed forces, or obtain a court declaration in order to be emancipated. Id. See also id.
§ 64 (specifying the procedure to obtain a court declaration of emancipation).
62. See id. § 25 (a minor is anyone under 18 years of age).
63. CAL. HEALTH & SsaF-Y CODE 25958(a) ('West Supp. 1988). Consent of the legal guardian
of the minor is sufficient. Furthermore, parental consent is not required when a medical emergency
exists. Id. See CAL. CirV. CODE § 34.5 (West Supp. 1988). An unemancipated minor may receive
an abortion without parental consent only as provided by California Health and Safety Code
section 25958. Id. Additionally, any person who knowingly performs an abortion on an unmarried
or unemancipated minor without complying with the requirements of A.B. 2274 commits a
misdemeanor. CAL. HEALTH & SarrY CODE § 25958(0 (West Supp. 1988). The person is subject
to a fine not exceeding $1000, confinement in the county jail for a period not exceeding 30 days,
or both. Id.
64. If a minor chooses to petition, the court must assist the minor or person designated by
the minor in preparing the required petition and notices. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958(b)
(West Supp. 1988). The petition must specify the reasons of the minor for the request. Id.
65. Id. The court must ensure that the identity of the minor is kept confidential. Confiden-
tiality may be accomplished by filing the petition using only the initials of the minor or a
pseudonym. The minor may participate in the juvenile court proceedings on her own behalf, and
the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor. Furthermore, the court must advise
the minor of her right to request court appointed counsel. In addition, the hearing must be set
within three days from the filing of the petition. Id. No fees or costs incurred in connection
with the procedures required by A.B. 2274 will be chargeable to the minor, the parents of the
minor, or the legal guardian of the minor. Id. § 25958(e).
66. Id. § 25958(c)(1). See generally Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476,
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the adolescent does not possess sufficient maturity and information,
the court must grant the petition without parental consent or notifi-
cation if the best interests of the minor warrant the abortion. 67 If the
best interests of the minor do not warrant the abortion the court must
deny the petition. 6s
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO A.B. 2274
Several constitutional questions are raised by A.B. 2274. The first
challenge to A.B. 2274 is under the federal constitutional right to
privacy. 69 While several states require parental consent for a minor to
obtain an abortion, 70 no state statute has been worded similarly to the
California parental consent statute. The California Legislature has
attempted to create a statute based upon United States Supreme Court
precedent.
A.B. 2274 may unduly burden the constitutional rights of those
minors who are mature and informed or for whom an abortion is in
their best interest.7' The constitutionality of A.B. 2274 may be chal-
lenged if the statute is predicated upon the existence of a specific set
of facts which no longer exist.72 The underlying facts and assumptions
of A.B. 2274 may not be valid. Consequently, A.B. 2274 may unduly
burden the rights of those minors who are mature and informed or
for whom an abortion would be in their best interest.7 3
490-93 (1983) (discussing a Missouri abortion statute that required a court to receive evidence on
the emotional development, maturity, intellect, and understanding of the minor for purposes of
showing good cause for granting or denying her petition).
67. CAL. HEALTH & SAP=F CODE § 25958(c)(2) (vest Supp. 1988). A.B. 2274 does not
contain any guidelines to assist the courts in determining whether the performance of an abortion
would be in the best interest of the minor. See id. § 25958.
68. Id. § 25958(c)(2). Judgment must be entered within one court day from the petition
hearing. Id. § 25958(c). If the petition is denied, A.B. 2274 permits the minor to appeal judgment
by filing a written notice of appeal at anytime after the judgment is entered. Id. § 25958(d).
Judgment must be entered within one court day of the appeal. The specific rules regulating the
practice and procedure of appeals and the time and manner in which any appellate record must
be prepared and filed will be prescribed by the Judicial Council at a later time. Finally, the
appellate hearing must be set within five days from the filing of a notice to appeal. Id.
69. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (a person may not be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law).
70. See supra note 3 (providing a list of states with parental consent statutes).
71. See infra notes 122-71 and accompanying text.
72. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938).
73. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 773-77 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd, 827 F.2d
1101, vacated & reh'g granted, 835 F.2d. 1545, order rescinded, 835 F.2d. 1546 (8th Cir. 1987)
(discussing how the parental notification statute Minnesota enacted unduly burdened mature and
best interest minors).
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A final challenge to the validity of A.B. 2274 may arise under the
California Constitution. Unlike the United States Constitution, the
California Constitution guarantees citizens an express right to privacy. 74
The California Supreme Court has interpreted this right to privacy to
encompass a broad range of activities.75 Additionally, the California
Constitution guarantees the right to privacy to "all persons," a phrase
that includes minors.7 6 Consequently, the right to privacy under the
California Constitution may protect minors as well as adults seeking
an abortion free from state interference.
77
A. Challenges to A.B. 2274 Under the United States Constitution
1. Right to Privacy
The right to privacy guaranteed by the United States Constitution
is a right implied from the federal charter.78 The right to privacy was
first articulated in Griswold v. Connecticut.7 9 The Griswold Court
drew the substance of the right of privacy from a number of the
guarantees in the Bill of Rights. 0 As a result of the enunciation of
the right to privacy, Griswold held unconstitutional a statute prohib-
iting the use of contraceptives by married couples. 8'
74. CAL. Co.'sT. art. I, § 1.
75. Planned Parenthood v. Van De Kamp, 181 Cal. App. 3d 245, 276-77, 226 Cal. Rptr.
361, 378 (1986).
76. Id. at 278, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
77. See infra notes 198-212 and accompanying text.
78. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Justice Douglas suggested that the
right of married couples to use contraceptives was found in a penumbra of rights guaranteed in
various parts of the Constitution, including the fourth amendment. Id. at 485-86. See generally
Clark, Constitutional Sources of the Penumbral Right to Privacy, 19 VL. L. REv. 833 (1974)
(discussing the development of the penumbral theory of the right to privacy).
79. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
80. Griswold, 381 U.S at 479-486.
81. Id. at 485-86. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). In Eisenstadt, the United
States Supreme Court expanded Griswold to include unmarried as well as married couples. Id.
at 454-55. Eisenstadt involved a Massachusetts statute that prohibited the distribution of contra-
ceptives and information to unmarried persons. Id. at 440-42. Although the Eisenstadt Court
noted that in Griswold the right to privacy inhered in the marital relationship, the Supreme
Court explained that the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of
its own. Rather, the association is one of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional makeup. Thus, the Eisenstadt Court concluded that the right to privacy allowed the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the'decision whether to bear children. Id. at 453-54. Consequently,
the Eisenstadt Court struck down the Massachusetts statute and expanded the right to privacy
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a. Parameters of the Federal Right to Privacy
Roe v. Wade. - brought abortion within the protection of the right
of privacy by holding that the right to privacy "was broad enough to
encompass the woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy. '"83 The Roe Court, however, stated that the right of privacy
was not an absolute right. 84 Under Roe, any statute that burdens a
fundamental right will be upheld if the statute passes a "compelling
state interest" test. 5 In order to meet the compelling state interest
test, the statute must be ffarrowly drawn to reflect "only the legitimate
state interest at stake. '8 6
The United States Supreme Court has also held that procreation
decisions of both minors and adults are protected. 7 Thus, the logical
conclusion from Roe is that state regulation of the decision of the
minor to terminate her pregnancy can be justified only by a compelling
state interest and only if the regulation is narrowly drawn.88 This
conclusion is further supported by the fact that the Roe Court based
the right to an abortion on the right to privacy of the individual, not
to include unmarried as well as married couples. Id. at 454-55. In reaching their conclusion, the
Eisenstadt Court quoted the concurrence of Justice Jackson in Railway Express Agency v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949):
[Nlothing opens the door to arbitrary action -so effectively as to allow those officials
to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape
the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were
affected.
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S, at 454 (quoting Railway Express Agency, 336 U.S. at 112-13 (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
82. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
83. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
84. Id. at 154-55.
85. Id. at 155.
86. Id.
87. See Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1977) (neither the state
nor the parents of the minor may prevent the distribution of contraceptives to minors because
the overriding right to privacy in connection with decisions affecting procreation extends to
minors as well as adults). See also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979) ("A child, merely
on account of his minority, is not beyond the protection of the Constitution."); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Minors, as well as adults, are protected by
the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) ("neither
the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone"). See generally Note, The
Minor's Right of Privacy: Limitations on State Action after Danforth and Carey, 77 CotUM. L.
REv. 1216, 1220 n.28 (1977) (providing a survey of the Supreme Court's "ad hoe adjudication"
of the various constitutional rights extended to minors).
88. See Note, Where for Art Thou Danforth: Beflotti v. Baird, 7 PEPPaRni¢a L. Rav. 965,
973 (1980) (focusing upon the constitutional parameters of the right of a minor to make an
independent abortion decision).
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merely the right to privacy of an adult.8 9 According to the Roe Court,
the ability of an individual to make an autonomous decision comprised
the very nature of the privacy rightP°
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,9' however, distinguished between
the extent of the right to privacy for adults and the right to privacy
for minors. In Danforth, the Court stated, "Minors, as well as adults,
are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.
The Court indeed, however, long has recognized that the state has
somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than
of adults.'' Moreover, the Bellotti 1I Court was in accord with the
Danforth Court by refusing to apply the compelling state interest test
to state statutes infringing on the right to privacy of minors. 93 More
recently, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the approach
taken in Bellotti II and Danforth in City of Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health.Y Consequently, restrictions on the federal
constitutional privacy rights of minors will be upheld if the restrictions
serve any "significant state interest ... not present in the case of an
adult." 95
89. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973). See supra text accompanying notes 17-21
(discussing Roe v. Wade).
90. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-56. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The Eisenstadt
Court stated that if the right to privacy has any meaning, the right must encompass the right of
each individual to remain free from unwarranted governmental intrusion. Id. at 454. See also
Warren & Brandeis, 4 HAiv. L. Ray. 193 (1980) (the right to privacy is consistently referred to
as individual in nature). In essence, the United States Supreme Court in Roe and Eisenstadt was
merely echoing Justice Brandeis who described "the right to be let alone" as "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man." Ohnstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis expressed a view of politics
expounded by John Stuart Mill:
The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our
own way, so long as we don't deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to
obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental
and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems
good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.
J.S. MIiL, ON LmERTY 14 (D. Spitz, ed. 1975).
91. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). See supra text accompanying notes 22-27 (discussing Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth).
92. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
93. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1978). Justice Powell, writing for the plurality,
recognized the constitutional rights of minors are not on a level equal with those of adults for
three reasons. Id. at 634. Those reasons included "the peculiar vulnerability of children; their
inability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature manner; and the importance of
the parental role in child rearing." Id.
94. 462 U.S. 416, 427 n.10 (1983). See supra text accompanying notes 42-45 (discussing City
of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health). See also Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 663 F.2d
1532, 1536 (1985), aff'd mem., - U.S.-, 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987), reg'h denied,
U.S. , 108 S. Ct. 1064 (1988) (reaffirming the lesser standard for minors).
95. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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b. Application of the Standard to A.B. 2274
Under A.B. 2274, the articulated interest of the state is to encourage
parental involvement in the abortion decisions of their adolescent
daughters. 96 "Any independent interest" 97 that the parent might pos-
sess, however, does not outweigh the privacy rights of the minor in
the abortion context.9s The burden of demonstrating a connection
between the regulation and the asserted state policy is on the state. 9
Neither a bare assertion that the burden is connected to a significant
state policy, 10 nor sentiment or folklore,10 1 will satisfy this burden.'l 2
The California Legislature attempts to satisfy the burden by basing
the language of A.B. 2274 upon the language found in Bellotti I1'03
In Bellotti II, a plurality suggested that the Court would uphold a
statute as constitutional if the state provided, in addition to parental
consent, an alternative procedure for the minor to obtain an abor-
tion.' °0 The Bellotti 11 plurality also required the completion of the
proceeding with anonymity for the minor and with sufficient expedition
to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion. 15
The Carey Court stated:
Such lesser scrutiny is appropriate both because of the State's greater latitude to regulate
the conduct of children, . . . and because the right of privacy implicated here is "the
interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions," . . . and the
law has generally regarded minors as having a lesser capability for making important
decisions.
Id. at 693 n.15 (citations omitted).
96. See 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 1237, sec. 1, at - (stating findings of the legislature).
97. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75.
98. Id. In striking a spousal consent requirement, the Danforth Court reasoned:
The obvious fact is that when the wife and the husband disagree on [the abortion]
decision, the view of only one of the two marriage partners can prevail. Inasmuch as
it is the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more directly and
immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in her
favor.
Id. at 71. Such an analysis is applicable to A.B. 2274 for the minor must bear the child and the
responsibility of raising that child. The Danforth Court itself noted that "much of what has
been said with respect to the [spousal consent provision] applies with equal force" to the parental
consent requirement. Id. at 74.
99. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 696 (1977); Indiana Planned Parenthood
v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127, 1133 (7th Cir. 1983).
100. Carey, 431 U.S. at 696.
101. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1967) (cited in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F.2d 772
(D. Minn. 1986)).
102. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 772 (D. Minn. 1986).
103. Compare CAL. HEALTH & SAanr CODE § 25958(a), (b) (West Supp. 1988) (alternative
procedure under A.B. 2274) with Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1978) (requiring an
alternative judicial procedure if the parents of the minor refuse consent).
104. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643.
105. Id. at 644.
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In a concurring opinion, however, an equal number of justices
criticized the constitutionality of such a scheme.106 Those justices
argued that the Court should not render an advisory opinion on the
constitutionality of such a scheme.' °7 An actual statute, rather than a
mere outline of a potential statute, may present questions other than
those addressed in the plurality decision."' A.B. 2274 which affects
pregnant minors seeking abortions may raise such questions.
Since Bellotti II, however, the Supreme Court has applied the
standards set out by the Bellotti II plurality.' °0 Thus, a statute requiring
parental consent before a minor may obtain an abortion must also
provide an alternative procedure."10 Four members of the current
Supreme Court, however, continue to adhere to the concurring opinion
in Bellotti 1I.n ' In the Ashcroft dissent, these justices noted that the
judicial consent requirements laid out by the Bellotti II plurality were
not necessary to the case and did not command a majority."12 Fur-
thermore, the dissent continued to adhere to the view that any judicial
consent statute would suffer from the same flaw the Danforth Court
identified: it would give a third party an absolute veto over the decision
of the physician and his patient.
113
A.B. 2274, however, is a scrupulous attempt by the California
Legislature to conform with the various opinions of the United States
Supreme Court. 14 By providing the minor with a judicial alternative
to the parental consent requirement," 5 expeditious petition" 6 and ap-
pellate review procedures,"17 and assuring the confidentiality of the
106. The Justices included Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Bellotti 1 443 U.S.
at 652 (Stevens, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 656 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring).
108. Id. Justice Stevens wrote, "That irony makes me wonder whether any legislature
concerned with parental consultation, would, in the absence of today's advisory opinion, have
enacted a statute comparable to one my Brethren have discussed." Id.
109. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490-91 (1983) (stating that
the relevant legal standards with respect to abortion are not in dispute); City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 439-40 (1983) (requiring the state to provide an
alternative procedure).
110. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of the Bellotti
II plurality).
111. See Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 494 (the Justices include Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens).
112. Id. at 504 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
114. See Review of Selected 1987 California Legislation, 19 PAc. L.J. 646, 647-50 (1988)
(suggesting that A.B. 2274 has complied with guidelines the United States Supreme Court has
enumerated).
115. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958(b) (West Supp. 1988).
116. See id. § 25958(b), (c)(2).
117. See id. § 25958(d). But see American College of Obstetricians v. Thornburgh, 656 F.
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identity of the minor,118 A.B. 2274 appears to meet the standards set
out by the Bellotti II plurality. Furthermore, A.B. 2274 contains
procedural safeguards lacking in unconstitutional abortion statutes of
other states.119 Safeguards provided in A.B. 2274 are a provision for
appointment of counsel to assist the minor in preparing the petition,
120
and the absence of a provision requiring a waiting period after judicial
consent is obtained.12 '
2. Undue Burden on Constitutionally Protected Pregnant Minors
Even if A.B. 2274 passes initial constitutional scrutiny, A.B. 2274
may unconstitutionally burden the rights of mature, informed minors
and those minors for whom an abortion is in their best interest.' 22 In
Supp. 879 (E.D. Pa. 1987). The district court refused to lift an injunction that enjoined a
Pennsylvania statute until regulations governing the confidentiality of the minor, prompt waiver
of parental consent, and appellate procedure had been adopted and reviewed. Id. at 890.
Specifically, the district court found that failure of a rule to provide for an expedited appeal in
instances where the trial court failed to act required a continuation of the injunction. Id. at 888-
89.
118. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958(b) (,Vest Supp. 1988). The minor may file
the petition using only her initials or a pseudonym. Id. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v.
Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 491 n.16 (1983) (confidentiality assured by statutory requirement allowing
minor to use her initials on petition).
119. Compare City of Akron v Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 439-
42 (1983) (holding statute unconstitutional where the petition of the minor could still be denied
after the court found the minor mature enough to make the abortion decision on her own and
the statute impermissibly required a 24-hour waiting period after the consent of the minor before
the abortion could be performed) and Indiana Planned Parenthood v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127,
1134-39 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding Indiana statute unconstitutional based on failure to provide for
expeditious appellate review of adverse decisions, and appointed counsel) with Planned Parenthood
Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 490-93 (upholding as constitutional a Missouri abortion statute
which provides that the court could not deny the petition of a minor if the minor shows that
she is mature enough to make the decision on her own and provides minor with expeditious
appellate review) and CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958 (West Supp. 1988) (allowing the
minor to receive the abortion if a determination is made that the minor is mature and sufficiently
informed, and also providing for an appeals process).
120. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 25958(b) (West Supp. 1988). See Indiana Planned
Parenthood v. Pearson, 716 F.2d at 1137-39 (holding Indiana abortion statute that failed to
provide for court-appointed counsel unconstitutional). See also Plafined Parenthood Ass'n v.
Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 479-80 n.4 (holding Missouri abortion statute that contained a provision
for court-appointed counsel constitutional).
121. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. at 449-51 (holding
a statute prohibiting performance of an abortion until 24 hours after the consent of a woman
to an abortion unconstitutional). See also Eubanks v. Brown, 604 F. Supp. 141, 145-46 (W.D.
Ky. 1984) (statute requiring a two-hour waiting period for an abortion was held unconstitutional).
122. See Hodgson v. State of Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 773-777 (D. Minn. 1986) (see
supra note 73 for subsequent history of Hodgson) (discussing the constitutionality of the parental
notification statute Minnesota enacted).
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United States v. Carolene Products Co.,' 23 the United States Supreme
Court stated:
Where the existence of a rational basis for legislation whose consti-
tutionality is attacked depends upon facts beyond the sphere of
judicial notice, such facts may properly be made the subject of
judicial inquiry.., and the constitutionality of a statute predicated
upon the existence of a particular state of facts may be challenged
by showing to the court that those facts have ceased to exist.
24
In Hodgson v. State of Minnesota,l25 the district court concluded from
Carolene Products that if a court could properly inquire into whether
a change has occurred in the factual basis upon which the constitu-
tionality of a statute depends, then surely a judicial inquiry into the
existence of a particular state of facts assumed by the legislature, but
never demonstrated, was also proper. 126 As a result, the district court
in Hodgson made findings to determine whether the Minnesota paren-
tal notification statute unduly burdened the constitutional rights of
minors. 127
An inquiry into whether a statute is constitutional as applied allows
an attack upon the assumptions underlying the statute.I2 Thus, the
assumption implicit in A.B. 2274, that an appropriate alternative
bypass procedure would serve the state interest in protecting pregnant
minors without unduly burdening the constitutional rights of mature,
informed minors or minors for whom an abortion is in their best
interests, may be challenged. Therefore, even if A.B. 2274 complies
with the requirements in the Bellotti II plurality, the California legis-
123. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
124. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153. See Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 774 (quoting Carolene
Products). See also New Jersey Citizen Action v. Edison Township, 797 F.2d 1250, 1260 (3d
Cir. 1986) (also quoting Carolene Products in a case challenging ordinances that regulated door-
to-door canvassing and solicitation). Compare Wisconsin Action Coalition v. City of Kenosha,
767 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1985) (ordinance limiting hours of solicitation held invalid) with City of
Watseka v. Illinois Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547 (7th Cir. 1986) (conducting de novo
analysis of validity of an ordinance similar to the ordinance in Wisconsin Action Coalition).
125. 648 F. Supp. 756 (D. Minn. 1986).
126. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 774. To the knowledge of the district court in Hodgson, that
court was the first ever to examine a parental notification or parental consent statute in actual
operation. Id. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416,
425 (1983) (enforcement of the ordinance enjoined before the effective date of the ordinance);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679, 683 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (enjoining the
statute at issue in Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983), one day after
becoming effective); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 645 n.25 (1979) (because appellees successfully
sought to enjoin Massachusetts from putting their abortion statute into effect, there existed an
"absence of any evidence as to the operation of judicial proceedings" under the statute).
127. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 774.
128. Id.
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lation may be unconstitutional because the alternative procedure places
an undue burden on such minors.
a. Psychological Implications of A.B. 2274 on Minors
Under A.B. 2274, if a mature and informed minor or a minor
whose best interests warrant an abortion cannot obtain parental consent
or does not wish to obtain parental consent, that minor must seek
judicial authorization for the performance of the abortion. 129 According
to the findings in Hodgson, the experience of going to court for
judicial authorization produces fear and tension in many minors. 30
Those minors who seek judicial authorization are apprehensive about
facing an authority figure who holds the power to veto their decision
to proceed with the abortion. 131 Furthermore, despite the confidentiality
of the proceedings required under the Minnesota statute,3 2 the district
court in Hodgson found many minors resented having to reveal
intimate details of their personal and family lives to the strangers
involved in the judicial proceeding. 3  Finally, the district court in
Hodgson found that those minors who sought the judicial authoriza-
tion were left feeling guilty and ashamed about their lifestyles and
their decision to terminate the pregnancy.3 4
129. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text (describing the requirements of A.B. 2274).
130. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 763.
131. Id. In testimony before the district court in Hodgson, the Honorable Gerald Martin
stated that in his experience of hearing parental notification proceedings that he did not "perceive
any useful public purpose to what [he was] doing in those cases" and found the court experience
difficult for minors. Id. at 766. Judge Martin testified: "I think they find [the judicial proceeding]
a very nervewracking [sic] experience." Id. Furthermore the Honorable William Sweeney testified:
[T]he level of apprehension that I have seen contrasted with even the orders for
protection, which is a very intense situation, very volatile, and the custody questions,
is that the level of apprehension is twice what I normally see in court .... You see
all the typical things that you would see with somebody under incredible amount of
stress, answering monosyllabically, tone of voice, tenor of voice, shaky, wringing of
hands, you know, one young lady had her-her hands were turning blue and it was
warm in my office.
Id. In addition, many minors become angry and resent the fact that they are being required to
justify their decision before complete strangers. Id. at 763.
132. See CAL. HALTH & SAFT CODE § 25958(b) (West Supp. 1988) (A.B. 2274 also requires
that the minor have confidentiality when seeking judicial authorization). See supra text accom-
panying notes 61-68 (describing the requirements of A.B. 2274).
133. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. 756, 763 (D. Minn. 1986).
134. Id. Judge Paul Garrity, who adjudicated the same bypass petitions while a judge in
Massachusetts testified in the Hodgson proceeding: "[The judicial proceeding] just gives these
kids a rough time. I can't think [the proceeding] accomplishes a darn thing. I think [the
requirement of judicial authorization] basically erects another barrier to abortion." Id. at 766.
Furthermore, Judge Garrity believed that going to court was "absolutely" traumatic for minors.
Id.
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The difficulty in choosing the correct course of action grows even
more enormous because of the impersonal judicial proceeding required
by A.B. 2274.135 A juvenile court unfamiliar with the complex and
evolving psychological makeup of the minor will undoubtedly have
difficulty reaching the correct decision. 3 6 Reaching a correct decision
grows even more difficult, if not impossible, in a formal judicial
setting where routine procedures necessarily become the norm. 137 Be-
cause an impersonal judicial determination cannot adequately protect
the complex dynamics of the abortion decision, A.B. 2274 unduly
burdens mature and informed minors or minors for whom an abortion
is in their best interest because these minors have the constitutional
right to make the abortion decision in consultation with their physi-
cians.
In addition, the abortion decision involves more than merely the
conscious recognition and appraisal of the risks involved. 3  Each
individual makes a personal, moral judgment in determining what
significance, if any, should be placed upon the fetus. 139 The courts
have recognized the presence of these moral issues in the abortion
decision. 140 By requiring minors to seek judicial authorization, A.B.
2274 unduly burdens those minors whose constitutional right to privacy
allows them to make the moral determination to have an abortion
without requiring them to justify their decision. '4'
135. See infra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing the formality of the courtroom).
136. See infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of an uniform
development rate in minors).
137. See infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text (suggesting that procedures in the court
become routine).
138. Note, Parent, Child, and the Decision to Abort: A Critique of the Supreme Court's
Statutory Proposal in Bellotti v. Baird, 52 S. CAL. L. Ray. 1869, 1903 (1979) [hereinafter
Critique]. See Bolter, The Psychiatrist's Role in Therapeutic Abortion: The Unwitting Accomplice,
119 AM. J. PsYcHoLoGY 312, 315 (1962) (advocating that a statement of a desire to terminate
the pregnancy should not be taken at face value in light of all the evidence for the unconscious
influences in the attitudes of women toward pregnancy); Gabrielson, Adolescent Attitudes Toward
Abortion: Effects on Contraceptive Practice, 61 AM. J. PuB. Ha T 730, 736-37 (1971) (detailing
the evidence of internal conflict in the abortion decision of pregnant teenagers at pregnancy
counseling).
139. Critique, supra note 138, at 1903.
140. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977) (noting that abortion surgery differed
significantly from other surgical procedures); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 103
(1976) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that the most significant consequences of
the abortion decision were not medical in character); Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 885,
484 P.2d 1345, 1353-54, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9-10 (1971) (Sullivan, J., dissenting) (distinguishing
abortions from other surgical and medical procedures undertaken in the course of pregnancy).
141. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756 (D. Minn. 1986). The district court found
that many minors were angry and resentful at having to justify their decisions to complete
strangers. Id. at 763.
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Furthermore, A.B. 2274 adds to the burden of those mature and
informed minors and those minors for whom an abortion is in their
best interest who wish to make an independent abortion decision. For
these minors who must seek judicial rather than parental consent under
A.B. 2274, the possible continuation of the pregnancy if the petitioning
court does not grant authorization and the resulting exposure to parents
is often an unthinkable alternative. 42 If exposure to the parents is
unthinkable, the pregnant minor has the choice of seeking an illegal
abortion or carrying the child to term on her own. Without the
assurance of parental support, the sheer cost of maternal delivery
services, as compared to an abortion, will weigh heavily against a
choice for delivery by the young unmarried woman who is uninsured
and cannot qualify for medicaid coverage. 143 In addition, lack of
shelter outside the home is also an important consideration when
making the abortion decision.'" While many states, in explicit recog-
nition of the lack of freedom of choice between abortion and birth,
are providing maternity shelter and care to minors,145 these institutional
homes may have long waiting lists, may be too expensive, and may
not provide the long-term shelter that is needed. 14 Consequently, A.B.
2274 unduly burdens the constitutional rights of mature and informed
minors or minors for whom an abortion is in their best interest,
because the possibility exists that the minor may be denied the right
to receive an abortion and must carry the pregnancy to term on her
o wn. 147
142. See Sacramento Bee, Nov. 24, 1987, at A4, col. 5. California Medical Association
President Frederick Armstrong stated:
Contrary to what [A.B. 2274's] supporters argue, the law will not open up lines of
communication between a pregnant teenager and her parents. Where there is trust and
confidence between parents and teenagers, there is already communication. If there is
not, an unwanted pregnancy is a particularly poor way to begin.
Id.
143. Adolescent Pregnancy: Hearings on H.R. 12146 Before the Subcomm. on Select Educ.
of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 59-60 (1978) (testimony of
Chris Mooney) [hereinafter House Hearings].
144. Id. at 59.
145. See, e.g., CAL. WE. & IsT. CoDE §§ 16144.1-16144.31 (West Supp. 1988) (providing
for maternity care for minors).
146. House Hearings, supra note 143, at 59.
147. See Bonavoglia, Kathy's Day In Court, Ms., April 1988, at 46. In a test case of the
Alabama parental consent statute, the trial judge denied the request of "Kathy" to receive an
abortion because she was not mature enough, and the abortion was not in her best interest
despite the fact that Kathy had been working full-time, and her alcoholic stepfather abused her
mother and herself. Id. at 48. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeal, however, overturned the
trial court in a scathing decision:
The trial judge in this case abused his discretion by denying the minor's request....
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If the mature, informed minor or a minor whose best interests
warrant an abortion elects to seek parental consent rather than pursue
judicial authorization, her constitutional rights may nevertheless be
unduly burdened.' A.B. 2274 assumes that parents can and do identify
the course of action corresponding to the best interests of their
children. In a perfect situation, the abortion decision would involve a
counseling role for parents. 149 This counseling would help the minor
to reach the correct and most suitable decision and would presumably
protect the physical and psychological well being of the pregnant
adolescent. Uncertainty, however, exists as to the value of parental
involvement under the best of circumstances50 since nothing in the
consent statute ensures correct parental decision-making.' Conse-
quently, irrespective of whether the mature, informed minor or the
minor whose best interests warrant an abortion seeks parental consent
or a judicial order, A.B. 2274 does not guarantee that the minor will
receive the psychological guidance that she needs to make a correct
decision.
In sum, A.B. 2274 makes the choices of mature and informed
minors and minors whose best interests warrant an abortion more
difficult. First, these minors can seek parental consent.- 2 Second, these
minors can seek a judicial determination that may deny the abortion.
This possibility can leave the minor with an embarrassing and un-
More importantly, we can neither discern from the trial court's judgment nor from
the record any ground upon which the trial court's conclusion could rest. We can
safely say, having considered the record, that, should this minor not meet the criteria
for "maturity" under the statute, it is difficult to imagine one who would.
Id. at 49. Additionally, the possibility exists that when deciding whether to seek judicial
intervention and authorization, rather than face possible iejection in the juvenile court, the minor
would opt to carry the pregnancy to term. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 763-
64 (D. Minn. 1986). The Hodgson court found that some mature and best interest minors are
so daunted by the judicial bypass procedure that they decide to skip the bypass option and either
inform their parents or carry the pregnancy to term. Id. at 763. In addition the Hodgson court
found that some minors are so upset at the bypass proceeding that those minors consider the
proceeding more difficult than the medical procedure itself. Id. at 763-64. Indeed, the court
found that the anxiety from the proceeding may linger until the time of the medical procedure
and cause the medical procedure to be more difficult than necessary. Id. at 764.
148. See Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 763-64 (discussing the fear some minors have of going
to court).
149. See C. CsusN, ADoLEscENr SEXaunry IN A CAiomno AlsmucAN Socmrv 139-40
(1978). Studies of histories of teenagers who engage in premarital sexual intercourse, however,
have revealed poor communication with parents, a lack of supervision and affection in the home,
and a personal sense of alienation from family. Id.
150. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 792-94 (5th Cir. 1975).
151. Id.
152. But see C. CnimAN, supra note 149, at 139-40. Teenagers seeking parental consent may
find consent difficult because of tension between the parents and child. Id.
1506
1988 / California's Parental Consent Statute
wanted pregnancy. Third, these minors can seek an illegal abortion
that does not require third party consent, but has documented health
and safety risks,153 or carry the pregnancy to term. Because A.B. 2274
requires mature and informed minors and minors whose best interests
warrant an abortion to make these difficult choices, the legislation
unduly burdens these minors when they seek to exercise their consti-
tutional right to an abortion.
b. Difficulty in Applying the Mature Minor Standard in a
Judicial Setting
A mature minor seeking judicial authorization may still be unduly
burdened if the court applies an inconsistent and unfair mature and
informed minor standard. 154 Without a carefully delineated framework,
the mature and informed minor standard allows judges to make
arbitrary and perhaps capricious decisions.155 A.B. 2274 provides no
guidelines for determining whether a minor is mature, informed, and
capable of making the abortion decision. 5 6 In addition, the United
States Supreme Court has failed to provide standards to guide such a
determination.157 Judges must rule on the right of a minor to obtain
153. H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 437-40 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall suggests several possibilities and cites studies suggesting the various possibilities. Id.
154. See CAL. HELTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958(c)(1) (West Supp. 1988). The "mature and
informed minor standard" is as follows: "If the court finds that the minor is sufficiently mature
and sufficiently informed to make the decision on her own regarding an abortion, and that the
minor has, on that basis, consented thereto, the court shall grant the petition." Id.
155. See Note, Judicial Consent to Abort: Assessing a Minor's Maturity, 54 GEo. WAsI. L.
REv. 90, 100 n.60 (1985). Abuse of discretion in the maturity determination parallels the problems
that occur in the determination of the competency of a witness. Id. See Rosche v. McCoy, 397
Pa. 615, 156 A.2d 307 (1959). In Rosche, for example, a trial judge inappropriately sought to
determine the competency of a seven-year-old child to testify by asking the child about the child's
belief in God, religious affiliation, and whether the child understood what God did to people
when they lied. Id. at 622 n.2, 156 A.2d at 311 n.2. Questions such as those presented in Rosche
could not have elicited information useful for determining the competence of the child to testify.
See Note, supra, at 100 n.60. The questions merely concerned the personal feelings of the judge
regarding the prerequisites of competence. Rosche, 397 Pa. at 624, 156 A.2d at 312. Even in
such a relatively benign context, the personal values and biases of judges can influence their
determination. In the abortion context, society does not benefit from allowing the disastrous
consequences of such biases into the decision making process. Note, supra, at 100 n.60.
156. Compare CAL. HIALT & SAFETY CODE § 25958 (West Supp. 1988) (no evidence relating
to physical and psychological evidence is required) with Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028 (Vernon
Supp. 1988) (the Missouri statute requires the taking in of evidence relating to the emotional
development, maturity, intellect, and understanding of the minor).
157. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490-92 (1983) (providing
no guidelines when discussing the relevant legal standards); City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 439-40 (1983) (failing to provide guidelines for a court
determination); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (providing no guidelines when delineating
the alternative procedure requirements).
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an abortion even though they are not familiar with the intimate
behavioral aspects of the minor.5 8 In light of the pressure on judges
to clear their clogged dockets and keep the judicial process moving,
they are unlikely to expend the needed time to acquire familiarity with
the intricacies of the teenager and her predicament.Y9 In addition,
judges perform this assessment in the artificial, imposing and formal
context of the courtroom, thereby increasing the likelihood of a
distorted determination. 160
Courts may not treat minors equally in similar situations if the
general guidelines for determining maturity permit excessive judicial
discretion.161 In order to ensure legitimacy in the decision making
process, the rules and principles of law should specify the appropriate
exercise of judicial discretion. 62 Under the mature and informed minor
standard delineated in A.B. 2274, a court can furnish an assessment
without specifying the facts appropriate and relevant to the determi-
nation. t63 Thus, the mature and informed minor standard amounts to
judicial discretion unbound by legal principles. 64 Assurance of a fair
158. See Note, supra note 155, at 98. The intimate aspects of the minor include her personality,
maturational and developmental history, medical background, family dynamics, emotional needs,
abilities, experiences, and interests. Id. See also Grisso & Vierling, Minor's Consent to Treatment:
A Developmental Perspective, 9 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY 412 (1978). In order for a judge to acquire
intimate knowledge of the pregnant teenager petitioning the court, the judge must review files
and reports, consult with relevant medical and counseling professionals, and spend time with the
minor. Id. at 424.
159. See Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior, and Workload of
Federal Judges, 55 U. Coo. L. Rav. 1, 9, 19 (1983) (suggesting clogged dockets cause the
decisional process to be less intellectually satisfying because the judge has insufficient time for
personal involvement and reflection). See also Albanese, Concern About Variation in Criminal
Sentences: A Cyclical History of Reform, 75 J. Caim. L. & CumuNOLOOY 260, 262 (1984)
(suggesting caseload is a significant factor in creating disparity in sentencing).
160. Note, supra note 155, at 99. See also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 n.22 (suggesting
that procedures and forums that are less formal than a judicial proceeding may be more
beneficial).
161. Note, supra note 155, at 99. See Comment, The Validity of Parental Consent Statutes
After Planned Parenthood, 54 U. DaT. J. URn. L. 127, 160 (1976). Standardless discretion does
not further any state purpose in any context, especially when that discretion involves passing
upon the validity of a fundamental right. Id. See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
The Yick Wo Court wrote:
mhe very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of
living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere vill of
another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the
essence of slavery itself.
Id. at 370.
162. See K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JusncE: A PRELuIINARY INQUIRY 3-26 (1969) (suggesting
that discretion is not indulgence of whim on the part of the judge, but rather is based on facts
and guided by the spirit and principles of law).
163. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958 (West Supp. 1988).
164. Note, supra note 155, at 99 n.57.
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determination for the pregnant adolescent, therefore, becomes impos-
sible when such an arbitrary standard applies. 16 5
The assurance of equal and consistent treatment in the maturity
determination process grows further complicated by the subconscious
inferences a judge may draw from the composure, apparent analytical
ability, appearance, or proficiency of the adolescent in articulating her
reasoning and conclusions.'6 The values, prejudices, and reactions of
the judge to the dress, manner, and communication skills of the minor
may cause the feelings and beliefs of the judge to obscure factors
more relevant to the assessment. 67 Consequently, no matter how
valiantly a judge tries to avoid the superficial aspects of the manner
and demeanor of the teenager, these factors may unduly and una-
voidably influence the determination of maturity by the judge. 168
The fact that children do not develop at the same rate becomes
another complicating factor in determining the maturity and infor-
mation an adolescent possesses. An enormous range of individual
differences exist in the rate of growth, development, and psychological
maturity of adolescents even if the adolescents belong to the same
social and cultural group. 69 Moreover, even if the petitioning court
were to use objective standards, such as age or physical attributes, an
adequate assessment of the capacity of the minor to rationally consider
and comprehend the effects of aborting or continuing a pregnancy is
not guaranteed. 70 As a result, the use of subjective areas of inquiry
permit a more appropriate determination of maturity. These inquiries,
however, require more time and contact with the pregnant teenager
than a judge can reasonably devote.' 7 ' Therefore, in everyday practice,
no guarantee exists that the petitioning minor will obtain an adequate
determination of her maturity.
Thus, the interest California has in providing guidance for a minor
seeking an abortion does not outweigh the burden placed on minors
165. Id.
166. Id. at 99. A great variety of actions that cannot be categorized into generalized patterns
of behavior exist as adolescents move from childhood to adulthood. Furthermore, adults react
to adolescents in terms of their own personalities and in terms of how well they know the
adolescents as individuals. W. WNATENERG, Trim ADoLscWENT YES 31-32 (1973).
167. Lindsley, From Family Law to all Law ... Ruling Without Bias, 24 JunoDs' J. 18, 20
(1985).
168. Note, supra note 155, at 99 n.58.
169. D. KaRcH, R. Ctrucsinzw, & N. LivsON, ErEmmtrs oF PSYCHOLOGY 66-68, 739-40
(1969). See H. RoDmAN, S. LEwis, & S. Gsurms, THE SE=UAL RiGrrs oF ADOLEscENTS:
CoMPETENcY, VuN.nAnr, sAm PAmNTAL CONTROL 158 (1984) ("The potential for competence
and responsibility among teenagers is clearly not uniform across all areas of behavior").
170. Note, supra note 155, at 100.
171. Id. at 101 n.62.
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that are mature and informed or for whom an abortion is in their
best interest. Therefore, the California parental consent statute is
unconstitutional under the United States Constitution.
B. Right to Privacy Challenge Under the California Constitution
In addition to the right to privacy found under the United States
Constitution, the California Constitution explicitly guarantees the right
to privacy. 72 Under California law, fundamental rights guaranteed by
the California Constitution must be examined independently of the
federal right. 73 Consequently, A.B. 2274 must be evaluated in light
of the rights guaranteed under the California Constitution.
1. Parameters of the California Right
Article I of the California Constitution sets forth the California
Declaration of Rights. 74 The first section of article I establishes certain
inalienable rights. 75 In 1972, the voters of California amended article
I, section 1 to expressly include the right to privacy as an inalienable
right.
176
172. CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 1.
173. See Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976). The
California Supreme Court wrote:
[I]n the area of fundamental civil liberties which includes ... all protections of the
California Declaration of Rights-we sit ... subject only to the qualification that our
interpretations may not restrict the guarantees accorded the national citizenry under
the federal charter. In such constitutional adjudication, our first referent is California
law and the full panoply of rights Californians have come to expect as their due.
Accordingly, decisions of the United States Supreme Court defining fundamental rights
are persuasive authority to be afforded respectful consideration, but are to be followed
by California Courts only when they provide no less individual protection than is
guaranteed by California law.
Id. at 764, 557 P.2d at 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 366 (quoting People v. Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d 943,
951 n.4, 538 P.2d 753, 758 n.4, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302 n.4 (1975)) (footnote added). The
California Supreme Court has also stated that "[the] incontrovertible conclusion [is] that the
California Constitution is, and always has been, a document of independent force. Any other
result would contradict not only the most fundamental principles of federalism but also the
historic bases of state charters." People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 549-50, 531 P.2d 1099,
1113, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 329 (1975).
174. CAL. CoNsT. art. I.
175. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
176. See White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 773, 533 P.2d 222, 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 105
(1975) (discussing the adoption of the express right to privacy). Prior to the adoption of this
amendment, however, California courts had found a state and federal constitutional right to
privacy even though the right was not enumerated in either the California or United States
Constitutions. In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 431-32, 467 P.2d 557, 567-68, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829,
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The adoption of the amendment was intended to strengthen the
right to privacy. 77 The election brochure published by the state set
out the principle objectives of the right to privacy provision. 78 The
election brochure argument stated: "The right to privacy is much
more than 'unnecessary wordage.' It is fundamental to any free society.
Privacy is not now guaranteed by our State Constitution. This simple
amendment will extend various court decisions on privacy to insure
protection of our basic rights.' 1 79 Since the adoption of the amend-
ment, California courts have held that a broad range of interests are
protected by the right of privacy.' 80
While the right to privacy provided in the California Constitution
is not absolute, any intervention must be justified by a compelling
state interest.' 8' In defining the scope of the state interest, the decisions
of the California Supreme Court in City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson'
82
and Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers'8 3 firmly
establish that the California constitutional right to privacy protects
839-40 (1970) (holding that no constitutional right enabled a psychotherapist to assert an absolute
privilege concerning all psychotherapeutic communication); City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young,
2 Cal. 3d 259, 263, 466 P.2d 225, 228, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (1970) (holding that a financial
disclosure law undertook an overbroad intrusion into the right to privacy); People v. Edwards,
71 Cal. 2d 1096, 1103-05, 458 P.2d 713, 717-18, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633, 637-38 (1969) (holding that
the reasonable expectation of privacy was violated by a government search of trash cans of the
defendant without a warrant); People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 963-64, 458 P.2d 194, 199-200,
80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 358-59 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1969) (holding that a woman in
California had a constitutional right to an abortion).
177. Central Valley Chapter 7th Step Found. v. Younger, 95 Cal. App. 3d 212, 235, 157
Cal. Rptr. 117, 130 (1979).
178. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 774, 533 P.2d 222, 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 105 (1975).
The White court further stated that "California decisions have long recognized the propriety of
resorting to such election brochure arguments as an aid in construing legislative measures and
constitutional amendments adopted pursuant to a vote of the people." Id. at 775 n.l1, 533 P.2d
at 234 n.11, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106 n.11.
179. See Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 829, 134 Cal. Rptr.
839, 841-42 (1976) (quoting California Ballot Pamphlet of 1972, at 28).
180. See, e.g., Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d
779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981) (the right to privacy includes the right to decide whether to parent
a child); People v. Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d 697, 591 P.2d 919, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1979) (the right
to privacy includes the right of a person to make certain kinds of important decisions including
matters related to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing
and education); Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668
(1986) (the right to privacy protects a diverse range of freedoms including the right of a wife
not to have her home invaded by a television camera crew accompanying paramedics called to
administer life-saving techniques to her husband); Planned Parenthood v. Van De Kamp, 181
Cal. App. 3d 245, 226 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1986) (minors enjoy a right to privacy under the search
and seizure provisions of California Constitution article I, section 13, and that right is exercisable
against the parents of the minor and school officials standing in loco parentis).
181. Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal. 3d 859, 864, 553 P.2d 624, 628, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464,
468 (1976).
182. 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1980).
183. 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981).
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private activity from state interference.'14 In Adamson, the appellant
challenged a residential zoning ordinance that limited the number of
unrelated people that could live in a house. 8  The Adamson court
applied the compelling state interest standard to conclude that the
restrictions set out in the Santa Barbara ordinance did not satisfy a
compelling interest so as to justify restricting unrelated persons from
living together. 86 Thus, the Adamson court extended the right to
privacy found under the California Constitution beyond the similar
right found under the United States Constitution.'
8 7
Myers involved the right to public funding for abortions. 88 The
Myers court started from the premise that under article I, section 1
of the California Constitution all women in California possess a
fundamental constitutional right to choose whether or not to bear a
child.189 The Myers court used a three-part standard developed in
Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital District'9 in analyzing the
statutory scheme that prohibited the use of Medi-Cal funds for re-
ceiving an abortion.' 9' First, the state must establish that the imposed
conditions relate to the purpose of the legislation that confers the
benefit or privilege. 9 Second, the utility of the conditions imposed
must manifestly outweigh any resulting impairment of constitutional
184. Gerstein, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy: The Development of the Protection
of Life, 9 HAsTNGs CoNsT. L.Q. 385, 406 (1982) (discussing the need for a comprehensive
definition of privacy).
185. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d at 126-28, 610 P.2d at 437-38, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 540-41. Cf.
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). In Belle Terre, the United States Supreme
Court held that a similar ordinance did not violate the United States Constitution. Id. at 7-10.
But see id. at 16 (Marshall, J., dissenting):
The choice of household companions- of whether a person's "intellectual and
emotional needs" are best met by living with family, friends, professional associates,
or others- involves deeply personal considerations as to the kind and quality of
intimate relationships within the home. That decision surely falls within the ambit of
the right to privacy protected by the Constitution.
Id. (quoted in Adamson, 27 Cal.3d at 130 n.3, 610 P.2d at 440 n.3, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543 n.3.
186. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d at 131-34, 610 P.2d at 440-42, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543-45.
187. Compare id. at 124, 610 P.2d at 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 539 (concluding that a zoning
ordinance that restricted the number of unrelated people that could live in a house violated the
right to privacy expressly granted in the California Constitution) with Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at I
(holding that a similar ordinance did not violate the United States Constitution).
188. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 258-59, 625 P.2d at 782, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
189. Id. at 262, 625 P.2d at 784, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 871. See People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d
954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969) (the California Supreme Court first recognized the
existence of this constitutional right four years before the United States Supreme Court in Roe
v. Wade acknowledged the existence of a comparable right under the United States Constitution).
190. 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966).
191. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 265, 625 P.2d at 786, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
192. Id.; Bagley, 65 Cal. 2d at 505-06, 421 P.2d at 414, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
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rights. 93 Finally, the state must establish that no less offensive alter-
natives are available to achieve the objective of the state. 94 Using the
threefold analysis, the Myers court held that the California Legislature
could not deny Medi-Cal funding for abortions. 195 In concluding, the
Myers court stated:
By virtue of the explicit protection afforded an individual's inalienable
right of privacy by Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution,
however, the decision whether to bear a child or to have an abortion
is so private and so intimate that each woman in this state ... is
guaranteed the constitutional right to make that decision as an
individual, uncoerced by governmental intrusion. Because a woman's
right to choose whether or not to bear a child is explicitly afforded
this constitutional protection, in California the question of whether
an individual woman should or should not terminate her pregnancy
is not a matter that may be put to a vote of the Legislature.'
6
2. Application of the California Standard to A.B. 2274
Although A.B. 2274 does not directly restrict public benefits, the
threefold analysis developed in Bagley and Myers is helpful in deter-
mining the constitutional deficiencies of the parental consent statute
under the California Constitution. Restrictions imposed on the right
of a pregnant minor to seek an abortion free from government
interference do not relate to the purposes of A.B. 2274.197 The rationale
for requiring parental consent for an abortion by a minor is the desire
to encourage parental involvement and counseling in the abortion
decisions of minors.1 9 Although A.B. 2274 was enacted to provide
this involvement, practicality suggests that this involvement may not
result. For instance, clinical counselors who participated on a daily
basis in the implementation of the parental notification law in Min-
nesota found that the abortion law, more than anything, disrupted
193. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 265, 625 P.2d at 786, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 873; Bagley, 65 Cal. 2d
at 506, 421 P.2d at 415, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
194. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 265-66, 625 P.2d at 786, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 873; Bagley, 65 Cal.
2d at 507, 421 P.2d at 415, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
195. Myers, 29 Cal. 2d at 270-83, 625 P.2d at 789-98, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 876-85.
196. Id. at 284, 625 P.2d at 798, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
197. See Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 271-73, 625 P.2d at 790-91, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 877-78 (concluding
that the restrictions imposed on the right of poor women to procreative choice did not relate to
the purposes of the Medi-Cal program).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 53-60 (discussing the legislative purpose of A.B.
2274).
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and harmed families. 19 In addition, the Hodgson court noted that
minors seeking judicial authorization to terminate their pregnancies
without parental notification had already made their decisions and
that court personnel imparted no information and provided no coun-
seling in the course of the bypass proceeding.2 0° If a notification statute
provides little in the way of counseling and familial communication,
A.B. 2274 with the stronger requirement of consent will likely result
in more strained involvement because the minor must not only tell
her parents that she is seeking an abortion, but also must get their
approval.
Additionally, the utility of imposing restrictions on the right of a
pregnant minor to receive an abortion does not clearly outweigh the
resulting impairment of the fundamental and intimate constitutional
right of procreative choice. 20 1 In undertaking the balancing process, a
court must realistically assess the importance of the state interest
served by the restrictions and the degree to which the restrictions
actually serve that interest.202 Additionally, the court must carefully
evaluate the importance of the constitutional right at stake and deter-
mine the extent to which the ability of the individual to exercise that
right is threatened or impaired, as a practical matter, by the specific
statutory condition at issue.m The constitutional choice directly im-
plicated by A.B. 2274 is the right of the minor to choose whether to
bear children.3 Closely related to this fundamental interest is the
basic recognition that, for a woman, the constitutional right of choice
is essential to her own ability to retain personal control over her own
199. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 766-67 (D. Minn. 1986). Clinical counselor
Paula Wendt concluded from her conversations with both parents and minors that the Minnesota
parental notification law had not promoted family integrity or communication. Id. In addition,
counselor Tina Welsh concluded that the law had not benefitted intra-family communication.
Ms. Welsh believed that requiring a minor to tell either her parents or a judge about her
pregnancy and the reasons why she wanted an abortion made no beneficial contribution to the
decision of the minor. Id. at 767. California Medical Association President Frederick Armstrong
agreed with these conclusions:
Contrary to what [A.B. 2274's] supporters argue, the law will not open up lines of
communication between a pregnant teenager and her parents. Where there is trust and
confidence between parents and teenagers, there is already communication. If there is
not, an unwanted pregnancy is a particularly poor way to begin.
Sacramento Bee, Nov. 24, 1987, at A4, col. 5.
200. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 767.
201. See Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 273-82, 625 P.2d at 791-97, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 878-84.
202. Id. at 273, 625 P.2d at 791, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
203. Id. at 273-74, 625 P.2d at 791-92, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 878-79.
204. See People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 963, 458 P.2d 194, 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359
(1969) ("The rights involved ... are the woman's rights to life and to choose whether to bear
children").
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body.01 The primary purpose of A.B. 2274, on the other hand, is to
protect the well-being of minors by encouraging minors to discuss
with their parents the decision whether to terminate their pregnancies.206
Because the constitutional rights at issue in A.B. 2274 are clearly
among the most intimate and fundamental of all constitutional rights,2
A.B. 2274 will severely impair or totally deny the actual exercise of
the fundamental and intimate constitutional right to procreative choice.
While the state has an interest in protecting the welfare of minors,
only the most compelling of interests could "manifestly outweigh"
the significant impairment of the privacy rights of the minor that A.B.
2274 imposes. The state interest at stake, while important, is not
sufficiently compelling.
Finally, the statutory scheme promulgated in A.B. 2274 does not
serve the state interest in protecting the welfare of minors in a manner
least offensive to the right of minors to procreative choice. 20s If the
parental consent statute is designed to promote the welfare of the
minor, A.B. 2274 does not further a compelling state interest because
less offensive alternatives could be employed to achieve the same
objective. For instance, the state could require parental notification
instead of parental consent. Putting aside any constitutional problems
with a notification scheme, notification allows parental involvement
in the abortion decision-making process while still allowing the minor
to make the decision in consultation with her physician.209 Another
205. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 274, 625 P.2d at 792, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 879. Professor Tribe has
observed:
[I]f a man is the involuntary source of a child-if he is forbidden, for example, to
practice contraception-the violation of his personality is profound; the decision that
one wants to engage in sexual intercourse but does not want to parent another human
being may reflect the deepest of personal contributions. But if a woman is forced to
bear a child-not simply to provide an ovum but to carry the child to term-the
invasion is incalculably greater.... [I]t is difficult to imagine a clearer case of bodily
intrusion, even if the original conception was in some.sense voluntary.
L. TRME, AmEmc.N CONSTrTuToNAL LAW 924 (1977).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 53-60 (discussing the legislative purpose of A.B.
2274).
207. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 275, 625 P.2d at 793, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
208. See id. at 282-83, 625 P.2d at 797-98, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 884-85 (concluding that the
abortion funding restrictions did not serve the state interest in providing medical care for indigents
in a manner least offensive to the right of procreative choice).
209. See H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981). While the Matheson Court recognized that
parents have an important "guiding role" in the upbringing of their children that presumptively
includes counseling them on important decisions, the Court also noted that the Utah parental
notification statute gave neither parents nor judges a veto power over the abortion decision of
the minor. Id. at 410-11. See also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). The Supreme Court
expressly refused to equate notice requirements with consent requirements. Id. at 640, 657. But
see Dembity, The Supreme Court and a Minor's Abortion Decision, 80 CoLum. L.R. 1251 (1980)
(discussing the impropriety of parental notification requirements for a minor's abortion decision).
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method that the state could employ to assure that the welfare of the
minor is being protected is delegating the assessment of the maturity
and best interests of the minor to state trained and licensed medical
personnel. 210 Indeed, the California Supreme Court, prior to the adop-
tion of A.B. 2274, held that a minor may obtain a therapeutic abortion
without parental consent if the minor can convince competent medical
authorities that she possesses the requisite maturity and can give
informed consent to the procedure.211 Thus, the consent requirement
of A.B. 2274 is not the least offensive alternative. Consequently, A.B.
2274 violates article I, section 1 of the California Constitution.
CONCLUSION
While every individual has a view on the right of a woman to obtain
an abortion, the morality of abortion is not a legal or constitutional
issue. Rather, the morality of abortion is a matter of philosophy,
ethics, and theology. Abortion is a subject upon which reasonable
people can, and do, adhere to vastly divergent convictions and prin-
ciples. This comment has attempted to refrain from questions of
morality and instead concentrate on the legal and constitutional issues
the California parental consent statute presents. This comment has
shown that A.B. 2274 raises several possible constitutional challenges.
A.B. 2274 may violate the federal constitutional rights of the minor
by impermissibly interfering with the right to privacy of the minor.
Even if the language of A.B. 2274 falls within the permissible guidelines
the United States Supreme Court has enunciated for abortions by
minors, A.B. 2274 may unduly burden the constitutionally protected
rights of mature and informed minors and of those minors for whom
an abortion is in their best interest. As a result, A.B. 2274 should be
declared unconstitutional under the United States Constitution.
Even if A.B. 2274 is upheld as constitutional under the United
States Constitution, the parental consent statute should be declared
210. See Note, supra note 155, at 116. The validity of a medical approach is supported by
the United States Supreme Court treatment of analogous problems, by the treatment of teenage
abortion by other courts, and by legal precedent. Id. at 113-15. See also G. HERIUNO, ERODING
RoE: TnE PoLrncs AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CALIFORNIA'S PARENTAL CONSENT ABORTION
STATUTE .(1988) (available at the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law Library
as part of the Stauffer Fellowship Series) (suggesting that alternative legislation requiring social
worker involvement in the abortion determination would have been more appropriate).
211. Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 883, 484 P.2d 1345, 1352, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8
(1971).
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invalid under the California Constitution. The citizens of California
have an express right to privacy broader than the right to privacy
found under the United States Constitution. Consequently, proponents
of A.B. 2274 will have a stronger burden of demonstrating the existence
of a compelling state interest in regulating the right of a minor to
receive an abortion under the California Constitution. The proponents
of A.B. 2274 should not be able to meet the burden of the compelling
state interest test. Consequently, the California parental consent statute
violates the right to privacy granted to each individual under the
California Constitution.
Robert W. Lucas
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